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CLEVELAND v. POLICY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS CORPORATION:
TRIUMPH FOR THE WORKING DISABLED OR
HOLLOW PROCEDURAL DEVICE?
SARAH N. OTwELL*
In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.,1 the Supreme
Court considered whether a plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie
case of employment discrimination under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA) is judicially estopped2 from asserting such a claim
based on his or her prior assertions of total disability for the purpose
of establishing eligibility for Social Security Disability Benefits (SSDI).
The Court, relying on key statutory language as well as enforcement
guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC)3 and the Social Security Administration (SSA), held that re-
ceipt of disability benefits under SSDI does not inherently conflict
with being considered a "qualified individual with a disability" under
the ADA.4 The Court's decision is beneficial for a plaintiff who may
otherwise be precluded from bringing a suit under the ADA solely on
the basis of his or her receipt of disability benefits by removing the
judicially crafted barrier of estoppel. The Court ensured further pro-
tection for such plaintiffs' claims by holding that courts may not erect
* Sarah N. Otwell, J.D. candidate, 2001, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999).
2. The doctrine ofjudicial estoppel is designed:
to prevent a party from benefiting itself by maintaining mutually inconsistent po-
sitions regarding a particular situation .... [T] he doctrine is invoked to prevent
a party from "playing fast and loose with the courts," from "blowing hot and cold
as the occasion demands," or from "attempting to mislead the [courts] to gain
unfair advantage."
King v. HerbertJ. Thomas Mem'l Hosp., 159 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Lowery
v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 1996)). In order to apply the doctrine:
(1) The party to be estopped must be asserting a position that is factually incom-
patible with a position taken in a prior judicial or administrative proceeding; (2)
the prior inconsistent position must have been accepted by the tribunal; and (3)
the party to be estopped must have taken inconsistent positions intentionally for
the purpose of gaining unfair advantage.
King, 159 F.3d at 196; see also Loweiy, 92 F.3d at 224. This equitable doctrine is discretion-
ary and should be applied by a district court on a case-by-case basis. See King, 156 F.3d at
196.
3. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the federal agency charged
with the authority to investigate and resolve discrimination complaints under the ADA. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 to e-12 (1994).
4. See Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1600.
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a "strong presumption against the [SSDI] recipient's success"' in an
ADA suit by requiring him or her to meet a higher standard of proof
than is normally required to defeat a defendant employer's motion
for summary judgment.6
The Court's opinion is structured largely as an attempt to high-
light the key differences in the design and intent of each program.
While the Court provides ample support for its conclusion that there
is no statutory or policy-based reason for judicially estopping an SSDI
recipient from recovering under the ADA, its decision is not a total
victory for those ADA claimants that have made applications for SSDI.
To prevent dismissal of a claim on summary judgment, an ADA plain-
tiff must still present sufficient evidence of a valid claim under the
statute.7 Plaintiffs who successfully bring a suit under the ADA may
still be precluded from recovering the full value of any damage award
based on the persistent notion that such awards should be "set-off" by
the amount of the claimant's SSDI benefit.8 The import of the
Court's decision to remove a substantial procedural barrier for ADA
claimants should be tempered by an understanding of the additional
and very real obstacles which still face a plaintiff seeking to fully re-
cover for an employment discrimination violation.
Part I of this note provides an overview of the relevant portions of
the ADA and the Social Security Act.9 It also recounts the facts and
issues of law in the Fifth Circuit's decision of Cleveland v. Policy Man-
agement Systems Corp." ° Part II surveys the treatment of similar claims
by lower federal courts." Part III discusses the relatively straightfor-
ward reasoning of the Supreme Court in deciding the primary case. 2
Part IV examines the limited impact of this decision on the overall
ability of SSDI recipients to successfully bring employment discrimina-
tion suits before ajury and to fully recover under the ADA.'"
I. THE CASE
In order to understand the apparent contradiction in an SSDI
recipient bringing a suit for damages against an employer under the
ADA, it is first necessary to delve into the legislative intent and statu-
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 1604.
8. See infra note 164.
9. See infra notes 15-51 and accompanying text.
10. 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997).
11. See infra notes 52-116 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 117-142 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 143-192 and accompanying text.
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tory scheme of each program. On the most basic level, the ADA and
the SSDI programs were conceived to serve different groups of people
based on the ability to work. The ADA was designed to serve as a
"remedy for individuals who 'can' work and the disability benefit
progra[m] for those who 'cannot' work. 1 4 Upon closer examination
however, the distinctions between the two programs cannot be so
neatly capsulated.
A. Overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 199015 prohibits an em-
ployer from discriminating "against a qualified individual with a disa-
bility because of the disability."' 6 It was designed "to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities"" and "to provide clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities."18 The Act prohibits employers,
subject to the Act's jurisdiction, from discriminating against an other-
wise qualified individual on the basis of a disability in any area relating
to his or her employment.19 Under the ADA, a "disability" is "a physi-
cal or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual." ° A "qualified individual with
a disability,"'" is defined as "an individual with a disability who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."22 In order to assert an ADA violation successfully, in the ab-
14. Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tension Between the Americans With
Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1003, 1048 (1998).
15. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
16. Id. § 12112(a).
17. Id. § 12101(b)(1).
18. Id. § 12101(b) (2).
19. See id. § 12112(a). The Act defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees.., and any agent of such person." Id.
§ 12111 (a)(5)(A). The term "employer" does not include the United States or a "bona
fide private membership club" that is exempt from taxation. See id. at § 12111(a) (5) (B).
20. Id. §12102(2)(A). Disability may also include "a record of such impairment" or
"being regarded as having such an impairment." Id. § 12102(2) (B) & (C). Major life activi-
ties include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks... and work-
ing." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
22. Id. This section further provides that "consideration shall be given to the em-
ployer's judgment as to what functions of ajob are essential." Id. In addition, "reasonable
accommodation" may include:
making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities; and job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
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sence of direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must first make a
prima facie2 3 showing that he is a "qualified individual with a
disability.
24
B. Overview of the Social Security Disability Benefits Program
As part of the Social Security Administration, the Social Security
Disability Benefits Program provides monetary benefits to disabled
workers, dependents, and surviving spouses if the worker is insured
for disability insurance benefits.25 The SSA defines "disability" as an
"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."26 An individ-
ual shall be determined to be under a disability "only if his physical or
mental impairment 27 or impairments are of such severity that he is
not only unable to do his previous work but cannot.., engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy. ' 28 In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled,
the SSA proceeds through a five-step administrative process "that em-
bodies a set of presumptions about disabilities, job availability, and
their interrelation." 29  An applicant for SSDI benefits must swear
under oath that he or she is disabled for purposes of benefit determi-
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters,
and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
Id. § 12111(9) (A) & (B).
23. A prima facie case is defined as the plaintiff's production of enough evidence to
allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the plaintiffs favor. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTnONARY 1189 (6th ed. 1990).
24. Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a) (1) (1994). In addition, this section defines an eligible indi-
vidual as one who "(B) has not attained retirement age; (C) has filed an application for
disability insurance benefits, and (D) is under a disability." Id.
26. Id. § 423(d) (1).
27. A "physical or mental impairment" is one "that results from anatomical, physiologi-
cal, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." Id. § 423(d) (3).
28. Id. § 423(d) (2) (A). In addition, "[f]or the purposes of the preceding sentence
(with respect to any individual), 'work which exists in the national economy' means work
which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in
several regions of the country." Id.
29. Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1602 (1999). The five
steps are summarized as follows:
Step One: Are you presently working? (If so, you are ineligible.) See 20 C.F.R
§ 404.1520(b) (1998).
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nation." An applicant who makes false statements or misrepresenta-
tions of fact on an application for SSDI benefits may be convicted of a
felony and be subject to civil and criminal penalties.31
C. The Fifth Circuit's Decision in Cleveland v. Policy Management
Systems Corp.
In August 1993, Policy Management Systems Corporation
("PMSC") hired Carolyn C. Cleveland.32 In January 1994, Cleveland
took a leave of absence from PMSC after having a stroke.3 3 Unable to
immediately return to work, Cleveland filed an application for Social
Security disability benefits.34 In support of her sworn application for
SSDI benefits, Cleveland indicated that the stroke she suffered on Jan-
uary 7, 1994 left her unable to work and that she was still disabled at
the time of filing her application. 35 Cleveland alleged that upon re-
turning to PMSC in April 1994, she notified SSA that she would no
longer need disability benefits.36 Citing poor performance on the job,
PMSC terminated Cleveland in August 1994.37 In September 1994,
Cleveland renewed her application for SSDI by filing a "Request for
Reconsideration" in which she stated "I continue to be disabled,"38
and a "Work Activity Report" in which she stated she was terminated
Step Two: Do you have a "severe impairment," i.e., one that "significantly limits"
your ability to do basic work activities? (If not, you are ineligible.) See id.
§ 404.1520(c).
Step Three: Does your impairment "mee[t] or equa[l]" an impairment on a spe-
cific (and fairly lengthy) SSA list? (If so, you are eligible without more.) See id.
§§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.
Step Four: If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, can
you perform your "past relevant work?" (If so, you are ineligible.) See id.
§ 404.1520(e).
Step Five: If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment and
you cannot perform your "past relevant work," then can you perform other jobs
that exist in significant numbers in the national economy? (If not, you are eligi-
ble.) See id. §§ 404.1520(0, 404.1560(c).
Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1602-03.
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1994).
31. See id. Such penalties can include monetary fines and imprisonment of up to five
years. See id.
32. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 515 (5th Cir. 1997).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id.
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because she could no longer do the job due to her condition. 9 Fol-
lowing the filing of a subsequent "Request for Reconsideration," an
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") determined that Cleveland had be-
come disabled on January 4, 1994 and continued to be disabled
through the date of the ALJ's decision in September 1995.4"
A week prior to the ALJ's decision to reinstate her SSDI benefits,
Cleveland filed suit in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas against her former employer PMSC for wrongful
termination in violation of the ADA and the Texas Labor Code.4
PMSC argued that its motion for partial summary judgment42 should
be granted on the grounds that Cleveland had no prima facie case
under the ADA.43 It claimed that Cleveland's prior representations of
disability for purposes of receiving SSDI benefits effectively estopped
her from now claiming to be capable of performing her job." The
district court granted the employer's motion as to the ADA claim and
dismissed Cleveland's state law claim without prejudice.45 The district
court reasoned that because Cleveland claimed she was totally dis-
abled for SSDI purposes, she was precluded from making the inconsis-
tent claim that she was able to "perform the essential functions" of
her job in order to recover under the ADA.46
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling on appeal but
declined to hold that the receipt of SSDI benefits creates a per se rule
which estops a plaintiff from bringing a cause of action under the
ADA.47 Rather, the court held that the application for, or the receipt
of, Social Security benefits creates a rebuttable presumption that the
39. See id. Cleveland also continued to represent that she was "unable to work due to
[her] disability." Id.
40. See id.
41. See id.; see, e.g., Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.051 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999).
42. The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment was articulated in the
1986 case of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), in which the Supreme Court held
that:
Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In
such a situation, there can be no "genuine issue as to any material fact," since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Id. at 322-23.
43. See Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 515.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1598 (1999) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994)).
47. See Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 517.
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claimant or recipient of such benefits is judicially estopped from as-
serting that he is a "qualified individual with a disability."4 Despite
the Fifth Circuit's rejection of the district court's application of estop-
pel in this context, the Fifth Circuit nonetheless concluded that Cleve-
land's claim could not withstand PMSC's motion for summary
judgment.49 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether the law erects a special presumption that would significantly
hinder an SSDI recipient from simultaneously pursuing an action for
disability discrimination under the ADA claiming that she could per-
form the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommoda-
tion.5" It also granted review of the Fifth Circuit's decision in order to
consider the larger conflict among the circuits regarding the legal im-
plications of permitting an SSDI recipient to bring suit for discrimina-
tion under the ADA. 1
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Since the adoption of the ADA in 1990, federal courts have thor-
oughly examined the effect of receipt of disability benefits on the abil-
ity of a plaintiff to establish a prima facie claim under the ADA.52
Despite the lack of agreement among federal courts, the varying ap-
proaches to this issue can be described as laying along several points
of a continuum." The most limiting of these approaches involves the
use of judicial estoppel to prevent SSDI recipients from proceeding
48. See id. at 518. The court stated:
We thus leave open the possibility that there might be instances in which the
nature and content of the disability statement submitted to the SSA... would not
absolutely bar a plaintiff from attempting to demonstrate that despite his total
disability for Social Security purposes he is a "qualified individual with a
disability."
Id. The court further qualified its holding by noting that while it is "theoretically conceiva-
ble that ... the two claims would not necessarily be mutually exclusive," a SSDI recipient
would likely only be granted recovery under the ADA in a "limited and highly unusual set
of circumstances." Id. 'at 517.
49. See id. at 518 -19. The court found that because the plaintiff consistently repre-
sented to the SSA that she was totally disabled, "she has failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact rebutting the presumption that she is judicially estopped from now asserting
that . . .she was nevertheless a 'qualified individual with a disability.'" Id.
50. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1600 (1999).
51. See id. at 1601.
52. See Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir. 1997) "Numerous other
circuit and district courts have addressed this issue, including several district courts in this
circuit. The holdings of these courts vary widely." Id.
53. See Rascon v. United States West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1330 (10th
Cir. 1998).
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with otherwise valid claims under the ADA.5 4 Other courts have ad-
dressed the issue but declined to articulate a particular position on
the applicability of judicial estoppel to these cases.55 The majority of
courts which have dealt with ADA claims by SSDI recipients have re-
jected the propriety of employing judicial estoppel to resolve this pre-
liminary question of law.5 6
A. The Application of Judicial Estoppel
The Third Circuit's decision in McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc.57 pro-
vides an illustration of the most restrictive approach to ADA claims.
One of the only courts to endorse the use of judicial estoppel in this
situation,5" the Third Circuit upheld Disney's motion to dismiss its
former employee's claim of unlawful discrimination by holding that
McNemar was judically estopped from asserting his claims under the
ADA because of his prior sworn statements to various government
agencies that he was totally and permanently disabled and unable to
work.5 ' Although the court noted that it had not previously applied
judicial estoppel to similar facts,6" it cited decisions from other federal
courts which judicially estopped similarly situated plaintiffs from
"speak[ing] out of both sides of [their] mouth with equal vigor."6 1 As
54. See, e.g., McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc. 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1119 (1997); Budd v. ADT Sec. Sys., 103 F.3d 699 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
55. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir. 1996); Dush v. Appleton
Electric Co., 124 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 1997).
56. See, e.g., Griffith v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 382 (6th Cir. 1998); Weigel
v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1997); Robinson v. Neodata Servs., Inc., 94
F.3d 499, 502 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996); Rascon, 143 F.3d at 1332; Talavera, 129 F.3d at 1217;
Swanks v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
57. 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997) (HIV-positive former
employee brought action under ADA against former employer, alleging discriminatory dis-
charge based on his disability).
58. While other circuits have at times applied the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel to simi-
lar situations, subsequent case law in the same circuits dispels the notion that judicial es-
toppel is always an acceptable method of approaching this issue. See Dush, 124 F.3d at 962
n.8 (declining to reach the issue ofjudicial estoppel in the instant case, but noting that the
Court had previously determined that judicial estoppel could properly be applied in simi-
lar situations).
59. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 616. The court further noted that "McNemar's statements
on his disability benefits application are 'unconditional assertions as to his disability;' he
should not now be permitted to 'qualify those statements where the application itself is
unequivocal.'" Id. at 618 (citing Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. 911 F. Supp. 1351, 1361 (D.
Kan. 1995)); see also Scarano v. Central R.R. Co., 103 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953).
60. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 616.
61. Reigel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.C. 1994)
(holding that plaintiff was estopped from asserting that she was capable of performing the
essential functions of her job, rendering her claim under the ADA insufficient as a matter
of law); see also August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 582, 584 (1st Cir. 1992)
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such, the Third Circuit determined that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in applying the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel in this
case.
62
The Third Circuit further suggested that the intent of the statute
barred plaintiffs who asserted that they were totally disabled from re-
covering under the ADA. 6' Echoing the district court's rejection of
the holding in Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage., Inc.,' the Third Circuit
noted that "there is no indication that either the United States Con-
gress or the NewJersey legislature intended to provide disability bene-
fits to persons capable of obtaining gainful employment. '65 The court
concluded that a favorable decision for the plaintiff in the instant ac-
tion would permit a "double recovery" under the ADA and SSI, a form
of recovery that "is the province of the legislature rather than this
Court."
6 6
Although there is no Fourth Circuit case specifically addressing
the use of judicial estoppel when an SSDI recipient brings a subse-
quent claim under the ADA, a district court in Lemons v. US Air Group,
Inc. found that the circuit's lack of a definitive stance on the issue
("[h]aving conceded that he was totally disabled at all relevant times... no reasonable fact
finder could conclude that... he was a qualified handicapped person within the meaning
of Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 151B, § 4(16)"); Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 547,
555 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding that plaintiff was estopped from claiming that she could per-
form the essential functions of her job after having collected substantial benefits based on
her own unambiguous representations of total disability).
62. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 617. Because the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel is an equita-
ble doctrine to be applied at the discretion of the district court, a district court's decision
may only be reviewed for abuse of discretion. See id. at 617; see also supra note 2.
63. See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 618 ("Accordingly, a person unable to work is not intended
to be, and is not, covered by the ADA."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (1994) which provides
that:
[i]t may be a defense to a charge of discrimination ... that an alleged application
of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out or otherwise deny ajob or benefit to an individual with a disability has
been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such
performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation.
Id.
64. 859 F. Supp. 1138, 1141-43 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that an employee receiving
SSDI after being infected with AIDS was not judicially estopped from arguing that he was
qualified under the ADA).
65. McNemar, 91 F.3d at 620 (quoting Dist. Ct. Op. at 11). And indeed, the Court was
careful to note that an individual truly qualified under the ADA "who believes he or she
has been the victim of discrimination 'retains the option of filing'" such a claim pursuant
to the ADA statute. Id. (citation omitted).
66. Id. The court asserted that were it to permit a plaintiff to recover under both pro-
grams, such a decision would imply "that a person afflicted with HIV somehow should be
permitted to misrepresent important information. The fact that the choice between ob-
taining federal or state disability benefits and suing under the ADA is a difficult one does
not entitle one to make false representations with impunity." Id.
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provided support for the court's decision to apply the doctrine ofjudi-
cial estoppel in the instant case.67 The district court reasoned that
because the Fourth Circuit did not state that judicial estoppel could
never be invoked in situations where one position is asserted before
the SSA and a contrary one is made in connection with an ADA claim,
it was within the discretion of the court to find estoppel appropriate
in the case before it.' The district court derived further support for
its use ofjudicial estoppel by citing other courts within the circuit that
had reached the same decision.69
B. The Judicially Created Presumption
Echoing the position of the Fifth Circuit in Cleveland v. Policy
Management Systems Corp., some courts have taken the approach that
while there is no per se rule precluding an SSDI recipient from bring-
ing a claim under the ADA, there exists a strong presumption against
permitting such a claim to proceed.7" In Dush v. Appleton Electric Co.,
the Eighth Circuit declined to resolve its stance on the issue of apply-
ingjudicial estoppel in this context.71 It did, however, recognize the
trend among decisions in the circuit which "would appear to make it
significantly more difficult to hold that judicial estoppel will, as a per
se rule," prevent SSDI recipients from bringing claims under the
ADA.7 2 Notwithstanding the court's decision to adhere to the stan-
dards for summary judgment in this case, it noted that "[t] he burden
faced by ADA claimants in this position is, by their own making, partic-
ularly cumbersome."7
Further, the Eighth Circuit stated that summary judgment should
be granted for the defendant employer unless there is "strong coun-
tervailing evidence that the employee... is, in fact, qualified."74 The
67. See Lemons v. US Air Group, 43 F. Supp. 2d 571, 579 (M.D.N.C. 1999).
68. See id.
69. See id. (citing Reigel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.C.
1994); Hindman v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 947 F. Supp. 215 (D.S.C. 1996)).
70. See, e.g., Dush v. Appleton Electric Co., 124 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 1997);
Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
71. SeeDush, 124 F.3d at 962 n. 8 ("[W]e leave for another day the question of whether
and to what extent judicial estoppel ... will operate to prohibit someone who has formerly
claimed to be 'totally disabled' from making out a prima facie ADA case.").
72. Id. The court cites other Eighth Circuit decisions that rejected the application of
judicial estoppel to this situation. See Robinson v. Neodata Servs., Inc., 94 F.3d 499, 502 n.2
(8th Cir. 1996); Eback v. Chater, 94 F.3d 410, 412 (8th Cir. 1996).
73. Dush, 124 F.3d at 963.
74. Id. (citing Mohamed, 944 F. Supp. at 282 (holding judicial estoppel inappropriate
for this kind of case because of the differing definitions of disability in the relevant statutes,
but inferring a presumption against permitting SSDI claimants to pursue ADA claims)).
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court asserted that normally the prior sworn representations of total
disability carry sufficient weight by themselves to defeat a SSDI plain-
tiffs claim under the ADA.75 By suggesting that receipt of Social Se-
curity disability benefits is sufficient preliminary evidence to prevent a
plaintiff from succeeding on a claim under the ADA, the Dush court,
like the Fifth Circuit in Cleveland, effectively created a presumption
that the plaintiff is estopped from pursuing such a claim.
Like the Dush court, some appellate courts have recognized that
judicial estoppel is a possible approach to the resolution of such
claims but have declined to employ the doctrine in the instant cases.
In Simon v. Safelight Glass Corp.,76 the Second Circuit affirmed the
lower court's determination that the plaintiff's statements to Social
Security about his inability to work77 judicially estopped him from es-
tablishing a prima facie case under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967.78 However, the court did not decide the extent to
which judicial estoppel applies to similar claims under the ADA.7 9 In
Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary to
decide the applicability of the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel to prevent
the plaintiff from going forward with her claim because it found that
the plaintiff would have been unable to muster any showing of a
prima facie case under the ADA.8 0 Based upon the plaintiff's own
prior sworn statements that she was totally disabled coupled with med-
ical evidence supporting this claim, the court concluded that she was
wholly unable to work, regardless of accommodation.8
1
C. The Application of Summary Judgment
Other courts have openly criticized the application ofjudicial es-
toppel to ADA claims by SSDI recipients. These courts have cited the
differing purposes of the Social Security Act and the ADA as the rea-
son for rejecting judicial estoppel as an appropriate tool for resolving
this preliminary phase of an ADA claim.8 2 The Third Circuit recently
indicated in Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., that its decision in
McNemar is limited to the facts of that case and cannot be construed as
75. See id. (citing Mohamed, 944 F. Supp. at 282).
76. 128 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1997).
77. See id. at 74.
78. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
79. See Simon, 128 F.3d at 74.
80. See Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996).
81. See id. at 1482.
82. See Rascon v. United States West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1330 (10th
Cir. 1998) (citing Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 502 (3d Cir. 1997)).
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creating a per se rule of judicial estoppel.83 The Krouse court asserted
that "district courts in this circuit are misapplying McNemar without
first considering the unique facts of that case .... Courts should not
assume that McNemar always bars an individual's ADA claims merely
because prior representations or determinations of disability exist in
the record." 4 In Talavera v. School Board, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that beyond the Krouse court's discussion of McNemar, no other court
of appeals had thus far held that a plaintiff asserting total disability for
the purpose of receiving disability benefits is per se estopped from
bringing a claim under the ADA. 5
Rather than adopt the restrictive approach to an ADA claim by a
recipient of SSDI put forth in McNemar, the majority of appellate
courts that have addressed this issue agree that judicial estoppel may
not be used to preclude a plaintiff from presenting relevant evidence
in support of a prima facie case under the ADA. 6 In support of this
position, courts point to the fact that there is nothing "inherently in-
consistent" in being an SSDI recipient and bringing a suit under the
ADA. 7 In a memo issued by the Social Security Administration in an
attempt to resolve this issue, Associate Commissioner Daniel L. Skolar
indicated that definitions of "disability" under the Social Security Act
and the ADA are not synonymous.88 In an Enforcement Guidance
Memo supporting this position, the EEOC further stated that "be-
cause of the fundamental differences in the definitions used in the
ADA and the terms used in disability benefits programs, an individual
can meet the eligibility requirements for receipt of disability benefits
and still be a 'qualified individual with a disability' for ADA
purposes."8 9
83. See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503 n. 5.
84. Id. The court in Krouse further indicated that the Third Circuit's "Judge Becker is
persuaded... that McNemarwas wrongly decided, and believes that the court should recon-
sider it at its first opportunity." Id. at 503 n.4.
85. See Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 1997).
86. See Rascon, 143 F.3d at 1332 ("[wlejoin the majority of circuits and hold that state-
ments made in connection with an application for social security disability benefits cannot
be an automatic bar to a disability discrimination claim under the ADA."); see also Talavera,
129 F.3d at 1220 ("[wle agree with the majority of our sister circuits that a certification of
total disability on an SSD benefits application is not inherently inconsistent with being a
'qualified individual with a disability' under the ADA.")
87. Talavera, 129 F.3d at 1220.
88. See Daniel L. Skoler, Assoc. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., Disabilities Act Info. Mem.
at 1 (June 2, 1993) (No. SG3P2)).
89. EEOC, EEOC Enforcement Guidance of the Effect of Representations for Benefits on the
Determination of Whether a Person is a "Qualified Individual with a Disability" Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990, No. 915.002 (Feb. 12, 1997) (visited Jan. 24, 2000) <http://
www.eeoc.gov/docs/qidreps.txt>.
20001
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
One of the first courts to recognize the fundamental difference
between the two programs was the Seventh Circuit in its decision in
Overton v. Reilly.9" In response to a claim brought pursuant to sections
501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,9" the court found that
the determination that the plaintiff was disabled was relevant evidence
of the severity of Overton's handicap, but could not be construed as a
judgment that the plaintiff was unable to perform hisjob at the EPA.92
The court held that the additional evidence that the plaintiff
presented to support his claim that he could perform the essential
functions of his position with reasonable accommodation raised a
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment.9"
The decision in Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity94 provided further indication that while receipt of Social Security
disability benefits does not preclude bringing a claim under the ADA,
it may still be relevant to a determination of the existence of a genu-
ine claim.95 The court explained that the five-step process by which
an applicant is found eligible for SSDI gives no consideration to a
claimant's ability to work with "reasonable accommodation,"96 a con-
cept critical to the determination of whether a claimant is a "qualified
individual with a disability" under the ADA.97 It further noted that
even "[t]he fact that an individual may be able to return to a past
relevant job, provided that the employer makes accommodations, is
not relevant ..9.8. Thus, the fact that a plaintiff may receive an
unrelated disability benefit does not necessarily bar an award of ADA
relief.99 The court, in reversing the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, cautioned that this decision should not be construed to
mean that courts, when deciding the merits of an ADA suit, may not
90. 977 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1992).
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (1988) (providing federal employees the right to bring a
cause of action for employment discrimination).
92. See Overton, 977 F.2d at 1196.
93. See id.
94. 116 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
95. See id. at 587.
96. See id.; see supra note 29.
97. See Overton, 977 F.2d at 586.
98. Id. at 585. The court explained:
a finding of ability to do past relevant work is only appropriate if the claimant
retains the capacity to perform either the actual functional demands and job du-
ties of the particular past relevant job . . or the functional demands and job
duties of the occupation as generally required . .. throughout the national
economy.
Id. (citing Skoler, supra note 88, at 2).
99. See id. at 585.
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consider a plaintiffs statements made for the purpose of obtaining
disability benefits.'00 It recognized that an ADA plaintiff who is con-
sidered totally disabled by SSA standards may be unable to perform
the essential functions of his or her job, even with reasonable accom-
modation."' Under those circumstances, the plaintiff would be un-
able to establish a prima facie case under the ADA." 2 Several other
appellate courts have followed suit, finding that prior assertions of to-
tal disability, while not sufficient to estop a plaintiff from bringing a
cause of action under the ADA, may still be considered relevant to a
determination that the plaintiff is "a qualified individual with a
disability."1 °3
In Griffith v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., the Sixth Circuit reasoned that
judicial estoppel should not apply because the SSA does not ask
whether the applicant could have worked with reasonable accommo-
dation during the time period under consideration.10 4 The ability of
an individual to work with some accommodation is simply irrelevant
to a determination of eligibility for SSDI.' °5 The court also indicated
that there is no space on the SSA disability application for an individ-
ual to further explain that he or she in fact may be capable of continu-
ing to perform a job if granted a reasonable accommodation. 10 6 It
warned that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be "applied with
caution to avoid impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court
because the doctrine precludes a contradictory position without ex-
amining the truth of either statement."10 7 The court was reluctant to
proscribe the admission of any evidence tending to show that the
plaintiff was capable of performing the essential functions of his posi-
tion. Rather, it found that prior assertions of total disability made to
100. See id. at 587.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See Rascon v. United States West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th
Cir. 1998); see also Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Whether
in any particular situation there is an inconsistency ... will depend upon the facts of the
case, including the specific representations made in the application for disability benefits
and the nature and extent of the medical evidence on the record."); Robinson v. Neodata
Servs., Inc. 94 F.3d 499, 501 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[a]t best, the Social Security determina-
tion was evidence for the trial court to consider in making its own independent
determination").
104. See Griffith v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 382 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 2018 (1999).
105. See id.
106. See id. The forms "require the applicant merely to check off boxes without com-
ment, or ... to fill in blanks with little room given for elaboration." Id.
107. Id. (citing Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990) (foot-
note omitted)).
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the SSA should be analyzed under the traditional principles of sum-
mary judgment. 108
In Talavera v. School Board of Palm Beach County, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit further explained its rejection of the application ofjudicial estop-
pel in this situation by drawing a distinction between presenting as
evidence a plaintiffs prior representations of total disability and as-
serting a position at trial inconsistent with these prior statements.10 9
The court noted that "an ADA plaintiff is [still] estopped from deny-
ing the truth of any statements made in her disability application.
Our basis for this holding is that an ADA plaintiff should not be per-
mitted to disavow any statements she made in order to obtain SSD
benefits."11 While a plaintiff may be permitted to present additional
evidence to support a prima facie case under the ADA, that additional
evidence may not take the form of false representations designed to
advance the plaintiff's cause, precisely the kind of position that the
doctrine of judicial estoppel is designed to prevent.11
Even in those courts that reject the use of judicial estoppel in
favor of applying the principles of summary judgment in analyzing the
preliminary merits of an SSDI recipient's ADA claim, plaintiffs who
are permitted to present additional evidence in support of their claim
under the ADA are not guaranteed a favorable decision. In Blanton v.
Inco Alloys International, Inc., the court clarified its earlier holding on
the same issue stating that while it rejected judicial estoppel as an ap-
propriate approach to this issue, it did find that "in light of the over-
whelming weight of the medical evidence, as well as Blanton's own
admissions, we find that Blanton was unable to perform his former
position of extrusion press crew leader as a matter of law." 12
Despite a court's refusal to apply judicial estoppel to an SSDI
plaintiff's claim, summary judgment may still prevent a claimant from
pursuing his or her case. The Seventh Circuit noted in its decision of
Weigel v. Target Stores that although it recognized that a determination
of disability under the Social Security Administration does not pre-
clude a plaintiff from bringing a claim under the ADA, in order to
succeed on a motion for summary judgment the claimant must pres-
ent an affirmative showing of his or her ability to perform the essential
108. See Griffith, 135 F.3d at 383. The court then held that the plaintiff had presented
sufficient proof to establish a genuine issue of material fact that would defeat the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment. See id.
109. See Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir. 1997).
110. Id.
111. See supra note 2.
112. Blanton v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 123 F.3d 916, 917 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Blanton II")
(citing Blanton v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 108 F.3d 104, 107 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Blanton I")).
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functions of the position.113 Without such a showing there is no genu-
ine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff is a "qualified indi-
vidual" under the ADA, and the employer will be entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.1" 4 In Weigel, the plaintiff was unable to show that
she could perform the essential functions of her position, with or with-
out reasonable accommodation."1 5 Without evidence to support the
claim that she was capable of working despite her disability, the court
denied her appeal from the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant.1 6
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., the Supreme Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision in a unanimous ruling by holding
that "the law [does not] erect a strong presumption against the
[SSDI] recipient's success under the ADA." '1 17 It then reiterated the
position taken by the majority of the circuits that receipt of SSDI ben-
efits does not automatically estop the recipient from bringing an ADA
claim. The Court further noted that "there are too many situations
in which an SSDI claim and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side
by side" to require the application of a special judicial presumption
which would prevent a plaintiff like Cleveland from asserting her
claim under the ADA.1 19
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer first addressed the Fifth Cir-
cuit's assertion that "claims under both Acts would incorporate two
directly conflicting [factual] propositions, namely 'I am too disabled
to work' and 'I am not too disabled to work."" 2 ° According to the
Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff may overcome the presumption against such a
direct factual conflict only in a limited and highly unusual set of cir-
cumstances. 1 2 ' The Supreme Court countered this conclusion by ex-
plaining that "[a] n SSA representation of total disability differs from a
purely factual statement in that it often implies a context-related legal
conclusion, namely 'I am disabled for purpose of the Social Security
113. See Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1997).
114. See id.
115. See id. at 469.
116. See id.
117. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1600 (1999).
118. See id.
119. Id. at 1602.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 1601 (citing Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp, 120 F.3d 513, 517
(5th Cir. 1997)).
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Act.' ,,122 Thus, a plaintiff's claim that she is eligible under SSDI does
not inherently conflict with a claim under the ADA to the extent that
courts may apply a "special negative presumption" like the one ap-
plied by the Fifth Circuit in Cleveland.123
The Court then discussed the manner in which the Social Secur-
ity Administration reaches this "legal conclusion" of disability for the
purpose of awarding disability benefits.' 24 It first noted that an eligi-
bility determination for SSDI purposes does not take the possibility of
"reasonable accommodation" into account, nor need an applicant
even refer to the possibility of reasonable accommodation when ap-
plying for disability benefits. 125 The "omission [of a detailed investiga-
tion of a plaintiff's work situation] reflects the facts that the SSA
receives more than 2.5 million claims for disability benefits each
year. 12' The sheer volume of requests for support, coupled with its
limited administrative resources prevent the SSA from making a more
detailed analysis of workplace-specific issues like "reasonable accom-
modation. '127 The Court reasoned that because the question of "rea-
sonable accommodation" in the workplace is simply not among those
posed to SSDI applicants, "an ADA suit claiming that the plaintiff can
perform her job with reasonable accommodation may well prove con-
sistent with an SSDI claim that the plaintiff could not perform her
own job (or other jobs) without it.' 28
The Court then presented three examples in which a plaintiff
could be considered eligible under both Acts. The Court first pointed
to the five-step SSA questionnaire designed primarily to facilitate the
processing of large numbers of SSDI claims.' 29 Although the SSA's
122. Id. at 1601-02. The Court distinguishes the issue in this case from one involving a
conflict of purely factual matters such as "the light was green/red" or "I can/cannot raise
my arm over my head." Id.
123. Id. at 1602.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 1602; see also supra note 29. According to the statute, the SSA will consider
the vocational background of an applicant for disability benefits only if "we cannot decide
whether you are disabled on medical evidence alone." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(a) (1998). In
considering the applicant's past relevant work experience:
[w]e will first compare your residual functional capacity with the physical and
mental demands of the kind of work you have done in the past. If you still have
the residual functional capacity to do your past relevant work, we will find that
you can still do your past work, and we will determine that you are not disabled,
without considering your vocational factors of age, education, and work
experience.
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reliance on this streamlined checklist was developed as a method of
efficiently processing a large number of benefit applications, "[the]
presumptions embodied in these questions . . . inevitably simplify,
eliminating consideration of many differences potentially relevant to
an individual's ability to perform a particular job."' The Court rec-
ognized that under the current system, an individual may validly be
deemed disabled by the SSA and still retain the capacity to perform
the essential functions of a job if provided a reasonable
accommodation.'1
3
The Court further indicated that under the statute, an SSDI re-
cipient is permitted to return to work for a nine-month trial period
without losing his or her benefits."3 2 The Court found that this provi-
sion reflected the fact that the "SSA sometimes grants SSDI benefits to
individuals who not only can work, but are working."' 33 The Court
suggested that this provision, by extending the grant of disability ben-
efits to a working individual, is clearly an example of a situation in
which a plaintiff may legally be considered "disabled" within the
meaning of the Social Security Act and still assert that she is a "quali-
fied individual with a disability" under the ADA."'
Id. § 404.1560(b). If the SSA finds that "you can no longer do the kind of work you have
done in the past, we will then consider your residual functional capacity together with your
vocational factors of age, education, and work experience to determine whether you can
do other work." Id. § 404.1560(c). The SSA defines "residual functional capacity" as "what
you can still do despite your limitations." Id. § 404.1545.
130. Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1603.
131. See id.
132. See id. The "trial work period" is defined as:
a period during which you may test your ability to work and still be considered
disabled. During this period, you may perform "services". . . in as many as 9
months, but these months do not have to be consecutive. We will not consider
those services as showing that your disability has ended until you have performed
services in at least 9 months. However, after the trial work period has ended we
will consider the work you did during the trial work period in determining
whether your disability ended at any time after the trial work period.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1592(a) (1998). Under this section, "services" are defined as "any activity,
even though it is not substantial gainful activity, which is done by a person in employment
or self-employment for pay or profit, or is the kind normally done for pay or profit." Id.
§ 404.1592(b); see also Lopez v. Cohen, 295 F. Supp. 923, 923 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (finding
participation of disability insurance claimant in "trial work program" under this section
could not be considered as evidence of lack of disability); Johnson v. Secretary of Health
and Human Servs., 948 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding disability claimant's work
performed during "trial work period," during which disability benefits recipient could at-
tempt to work without losing his or her entitlement to benefits, may not be used to support
finding that disability ceased during trial work period until those services had been per-
formed for a nine-month period); see generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 422(c), 423(e)(1) (1994).
133. Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1603.
134. See id.
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The Court then noted that the assertion of both claims could
merely be considered an example of a party legitimately "'sett[ing]
forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hy-
pothetically.'"1 35 It stated that "if an individual has merely applied
for, but has not been awarded, SSDI benefits, any inconsistency in the
theory of the claim is of the sort normally tolerated by our legal sys-
tem."' 3 6 Indeed, at the time the plaintiff brought her ADA claim
against PMSC, she had not yet received a final determination from the
Administrative Law Judge as to her eligibility for SSA disability
benefits.
13 7
The Court concluded that it would not place a judically created
burden on a recipient of SSDI benefits by constraining his or her op-
portunity to bring an ADA suit to "some limited and highly unusual
set of circumstances.' 38 The Court then turned to the standard of
proof required of such a plaintiff who seeks to bring a claim under the
ADA. It indicated that to overcome a defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, a plaintiff must explain how that SSDI contention of
disability is consistent with her ADA claim that she could perform the
essential functions of her former position, at least with "reasonable
accommodation." 3 9 The Court cautioned that a plaintiff who fails to
proffer a sufficient explanation for claiming disability on an applica-
tion for SSDI benefits will not meet the burden of proof required to
establish a prima facie case under the ADA. a4 0 Like many of the lower
courts, the Supreme Court recognized that an ADA plaintiff cannot
simply ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of a prior as-
sertion of total disability for the purposes of obtaining SSDI eligibil-
ity.' 4 ' The Court relied upon the well-established standard of
summary judgment when it concluded that
where [as here,] the conflict involves a legal conclusion ...
[the plaintiff's] explanation must be sufficient to warrant a
135. Id. (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(e)(2)).
136. Id.
137. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
138. Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1603 (citing Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp, 120
F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1997)).
139. See id. at 1603. "An ADA plaintiff [still] bears the burden of proving that she is a
'qualified individual with a disability' - that is, a person 'who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions' of her job" (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8) (1994)). Id.
140. See id.
141. See id. "[L]ower courts . .. have held, with virtual unanimity that a party cannot
create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contra-
dicting his or her own previous sworn statement... without explaining the contradiction
or attempting to resolve the disparity." Id.
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reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming the truth of, or
the plaintiffs good faith belief -in the earlier statement, the
plaintiff could nonetheless, "perform the essential functions"
of her job, with or without "reasonable accommodation."' 14 2
IV. ANALYSIS
In Cleveland, the Supreme Court clarified and adopted the posi-
tion of the majority of circuits that have addressed the issue of recov-
ery by an SSDI recipient under the ADA. Its holding reiterates the
notion that courts must adhere to the established principles of sum-
mary judgment with respect to permitting such plaintiffs to pursue an
ADA claim.143 More importantly, by removing judicially-crafted barri-
ers to a plaintiff's ADA claim, the Court reinforces the importance of
furthering the ADA's goal of ending and preventing employment dis-
crimination. The Court implies that the opportunity to expose dis-
criminatory behavior should be determined by the validity of the
complainant's case, not by his or her status for purposes of a federal
welfare program. The Court has already indicated that "[t]he objec-
tives of [anti-discrimination statutes] are furthered when even a single
employee establishes that an employer has discriminated against him
or her."1"
Further, the Court's decision marks an important point of inte-
gration between the admittedly inconsistent goals and purposes of the
SSA and the ADA. The SSA disability programs are based on the
premise that disability provides a legitimate excuse for the obligation
to contribute to society through gainful employment.1 45 These pro-
grams developed in response to the need to provide income support
to members of the "worthy poor," individuals who, by reason of a disa-
bling condition, are properly exempt from participating in the work
force.14 6 The ADA, on the other hand, recognizes and attempts to
permit and encourage disabled individuals to remain in the workforce
and thus continue contributing to the national economy. 147 The
Court's decision highlights the two programs' common goal of pro-
142. Id. at 1604.
143. See id.
144. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1995) (discussing
the importance of individual lawsuits in enforcing rights granted under Title VII and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)).
145. See Diller, supra note 14, at 1014.
146. See id.
147. See id.
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moting work activity among disabled individuals. 4 ' By declining to
apply judicial estoppel or other judicially-imposed barriers to bringing
an ADA suit based upon receipt of disability benefits, the Court im-
plies that even individuals formerly considered unable to work under
the SSA not only have the capacity to return to the work force, but
should be encouraged to do so.'49 This decision is a key component
of the federal government's overall intent to encourage recipients of
federal disability benefits to lessen their dependence on these benefits
by returning to the workforce. 15 ° The Court's decision can be seen as
an attempt to break down stereotypes of "the disabled" as unable to
work or otherwise contribute to society.151
On its face, this decision is a triumph for disabled Americans who
work, or wish to work, but face the threat of employer discrimination.
The Court's decision ensures that from a procedural standpoint an
SSDI recipient seeking damages for employment discrimination is
held to the same standard of proof as any other plaintiff presenting a
prima facie case under the ADA. Analysts suggest that the Cleveland
decision will result in more cases going to trial.'52 It remains to be
seen, however, "whether... courts will continue to use their authority
to weed out questionable ADA claims on summary judgment or
whether the courts will become more hesitant about granting sum-
mary judgment dismissals and instead allow cases to go to trial before
ajury.""5 ' An ADA claimant still bears the substantial burden of prov-
ing that he or she can perform the essential functions of the job, with
or without reasonable accommodation, despite the prior sworn asser-
tion in an SSDI application that he or she is "unable to work." The
Court's decision to remove additional procedural burdens from SSDI
recipients bringing employment discrimination suits ultimately has lit-
148. As evidence of this common goal, the Court focuses on the SSA's work-incentive
provisions that permit a beneficiary to continue receiving monetary support while working.
See Maureen C. Weston, The Road Best Traveled: Removing Judicial Roadblocks That Prevent
Workers From Obtaining Both Disability and ADA Civil Rights Protection, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 377,
439 (1997).
149. See id.
150. See H.R. REP. No. 106-393 (1999). The "Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Im-
provement Act of 1999" was designed to create incentives for disabled Americans to return
to work by providing for extended health care coverage and increased access to employ-
ment preparation and placement services. While this bill was signed into law several
months after the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland, it represents an attempt by the
federal government to encourage more disabled Americans otherwise dependent on SSDI
to return to work.
151. See id.
152. See Jonathan R. Mook, High Court ADA Ruling Could Result in More Cases Going to
Trial, 7 No. 2 EMPLOYMENT L. STRATEGIST 1 (June 1999).
153. Id.
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de impact on the plaintiff's overall responsibility to present a valid
cause of action. It is likely that lower courts will continue to strin-
gently scrutinize all ADA claims and dismiss them in the summary
judgment phase.1 54
Further, while this decision may appear to "open the floodgates"
and create a surge in the number of ADA cases filed in federal court,
the EEOC itself will continue to represent a serious obstacle to an
individual claimant's ability to even bring a claim, let alone obtain
judicial relief. Title I of the ADA adopts the remedial scheme of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act.' 55 This system requires individual claim-
ants to file charges of employment discrimination with the EEOC
prior to filing actions in court.156 Since the passage of the ADA in
1990, the EEOC has received over seventy-two thousand charges of
disability discrimination. 5 7 Of the fifty-two thousand dispositions that
the EEOC has pursued, over forty-four thousand cases were adminis-
tratively closed by the EEOC or resulted in findings of no reasonable
cause.' 58 The individual claimant may still decide to proceed on his
or her own by requesting a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC after
180 days of filing the claim, regardless of whether the agency has
taken action.1 59 But without the support of the EEOC, the individual
claimant alone must face "civil litigation, with all its attendant vagar-
ies" as the only means of attaining relief under the ADA."6 While the
EEOC's method of screening potential ADA suits may prevent un-
founded claims of employment discrimination from being litigated, it
may also discourage plaintiffs with valid claims from coming forward.
The Supreme Court's decision to remove procedural barriers impacts
only those plaintiffs fortunate enough to reach the federal court
system.
It also remains to be seen whether federal courts in which SSDI
recipients bring successful ADA claims will permit those plaintiffs to
recover the full value of any compensatory monetary award or instead
will "offset" or reduce that award by the amount of the plaintiffs SSDI
benefit. By confining its decision to removing court-imposed limits
on an SSDI recipient seeking to pursue an ADA claim, the Court's
decision in Cleveland provides only a portion of what will ultimately be
154. See id. at 2.
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 to e-6, e-8, e-9, 12117 (1999).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1999).
157. See Diller, supra note 14, at n.239; see also ADA Charges Received by EEOC Through June
1996, NAT'L DisAiLi-y L. REP., Jan. 16, 1997, at 3.
158. See Diller, supra note 14, at 1052.
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1999).
160. Diller, supra note 14, at 1054.
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needed to reduce employment discrimination of the disabled.16 In
order to achieve the goal of ending employment discrimination of the
disabled, the ADA granted successful claimants the ability to recover
compensatory and punitive damages against the defendant em-
ployer. 162 The provision of monetary awards in the case of ADA viola-
tions serves two primary purposes: to permit the victim of
discrimination to be made "whole" by recovering for his or her inju-
ries, and to enforce compliance with the statute by requiring employ-
ers to accept financial responsibility for any violations.
Some have speculated that the Court's decision in Cleveland will
lead to more plaintiffs receiving an impermissible "double recov-
ery '  under both programs. The basis for the argument against
double recovery in this context is that a plaintiff who receives a mone-
tary award as part of a successful ADA claim should have that award
"set-off' or reduced by the amount of his or her disability benefit. 164
According to this theory, a plaintiff receiving disability benefits is al-
ready being fully compensated for his or her inability to work, thus he
or she is not entitled to be made "more than whole" by additional
compensation provided under the ADA. This logic suffers from the
same deficiencies as the argument advanced by the defendant in Cleve-
land, namely that plaintiffs should not be permitted to benefit by mak-
ing directly conflicting statements regarding his or her ability to work.
Although the Court did not specifically address damages in Cleve-
land v. Policy Management Systems Corp., its reasoning and discussion of
the issues in the case permits the reader to infer the Court's position
on the question of an ADA plaintiff's recovery. By finding that there
161. While outside the scope of its opinion, the Court also did not address the impact of
this decision on employers. This decision may prompt an employer to take further steps to
protect itself from liability in the face of such a claim. For example, employers may seek to
take advantage of the statutory provision which permits "consideration [to] be given to the
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential" when determining
whether a plaintiff meets the requirements for a "qualified individual with a disability." 42
USC § 12111(8) (1994). The statute further provides that "if an employer has prepared a
written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this descrip-
tion shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job." Id.
162. See infra notes 168-186 and accompanying text.
163. "Double recovery" has been defined as "recovery which represents more than the
total maximum loss which all parties have sustained." BLACK's LAw DIcrloNAv 491 (6th ed.
1990).
164. See, e.g., Swanks v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 587 (D.C. Cir.
1997) ("Set-offs [based on previously awarded disability benefits] may provide a way to
prevent windfall recoveries while guaranteeing disabled persons the full protection of both
Acts."); Overton v. Reilly, No. 90 C 412, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20890, at 27 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
13, 1993) (ordering, in the damages phase of trial, that the plaintiffs front pay award shall
be offset by the amount of Social Security disability compensation the plaintiff will receive).
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are "many situations in which an SSDI claim and an ADA claim can
comfortably exist side by side" 65 the Court implies not only that an
SSDI recipient should be permitted to go forward with an ADA claim
but that receipt of Social Security disability benefits should have no
impact on the amount of damages an otherwise successful plaintiff
may ultimately recover under the ADA. The legislative histories of the
ADA and the SSA provide further support for the notion that Con-
gress intended to authorize "double recovery" for successful plaintiffs
under the ADA.'6 6 An examination of the collateral source rule1 67
also suggests that for those SSDI recipients who receive a favorable
judgment in an ADA suit, lower courts should refrain from reducing
any award of damages by the amount of the plaintiffs disability
benefit.
While there are additional sources of support for the notion that
plaintiffs should not have their ADA damage awards set-off by the
amount of an unrelated disability benefit, the lack of clear guidance
to lower courts on the issue of damage awards severely weakens the
statutory imposition of monetary sanctions as a mechanism for ADA
enforcement. Further, plaintiffs who receive less than a complete
damage award are "cheated" out of the opportunity to fully recover
for their injuries as a result of employment discrimination. In the ab-
sence of a comprehensive scheme for enforcing all provisions of the
ADA, the Court's decision marks a limited victory for those seeking a
substantive tool in the fight to end employment discrimination.
A. Statutory Support for Full Recovery Under the ADA
As part of the Civil Rights Act of 19 9 1,16 Congress granted plain-
tiffs the opportunity to recovery monetary damages under the ADA. 169
The ADA provides substantial opportunity for legal redress for indi-
viduals who can prove that they have been discriminated against be-
cause of their disability. Successful plaintiffs may recover from ,their
165. Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1602 (1999).
166. See infra notes 168-186 and accompanying text.
167. The collateral source rule provides that "payment which a plaintiff receives for his
or her loss from another source is not credited against the defendant's liability for all
damages resulting from its wrongful or negligent act." Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d
77, 83 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979)).
168. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in various sections of 29
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
169. See Robert Belton, Monetary and Nonmonetary Remedies in Employment Discrimination
Cases, C108 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING EDUC. 731, 733 (1995).
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employer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.' 7° The ADA provides that
these individuals may be entitled to "injunctive relief, such as rein-
statement or an order to reasonably accommodate, and may addition-
ally recover compensatory and punitive damages."17 1
In order to recover punitive damages, the complaining party
bears the burden of showing that the employer "engaged in a discrim-
inatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reck-
less indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual." 172 Unless the employer can respond to this claim by dem-
onstrating that it made a good faith effort to provide a reasonable
accommodation to the qualified individual with a disability,173 the
plaintiff may recover compensatory and punitive damages based on
his or her claim.174 The statute sets limits on the amount of compen-
satory damages awarded "for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
and other nonpecuniary losses," 175 as well as the amount of punitive
damages that an individual complainant may recover based upon the
170. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1999)).
The relevant portion of the statute provides that:
In an action brought by a complaining party under the powers, remedies, and
procedures set forth in section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 or 2000e-16] (as provided in section 107(a) of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)), and section 794a(a) (1) of
Title 29, respectively) against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination... the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive
damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief
authorized by section 7 06(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)], from the respondent.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (2) (1994).
171. Weston, supra note 148, at 400; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994). However, a complainant may not recover punitive
damages pursuant to this statute against a government, government agency, or political
subdivision. See id.
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (1994). The relevant portion of the statute provides
that:
[i]n cases where a discriminatory practice involves the provision of a reasonable
accommodation pursuant to section 102(b) (5) of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)] or regulations implementing section 791
of Title 29, damages may not be awarded under this section where the covered
entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the person with the
disability who has informed the covered entity that accommodation is needed, to
identify and make a reasonable accommodation that would provide such individ-
ual with an equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship
on the operation of the business.
Id.
174. See supra note 170.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (3) (1994).
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size of the respondent employer's business.176 According to the
EEOC, "other nonpecuniary losses could include injury to profes-
sional standing, injury to character and reputation, injury to credit
standing, loss of health and any other nonpecuniary losses that are
incurred as a result of the discriminatory conduct."1 77
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the majority of courts de-
clined to award legal remedies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.17' Thus, "no matter how egregious the discrimination, vic-
tims were unable to recover compensatory damages despite the emo-
tional suffering, physical pain, and related medical expenses that can
accompany such stigmatizing treatment."179 Although equitable rem-
edies were available under the former Title VII, they were "all but a
legal fiction for those victims of non-racial discrimination who chose
to stay on the job; back pay, reinstatement, or hiring provided meager
relief for those employees." 8 ' By adding these later provisions that
authorized the recovery of monetary damages in addition to equitable
forms of relief, Congress clearly intended for plaintiffs to be remuner-
ated for both financial losses and harm resulting from illegal work-
place discrimination. In light of the congressional intent to provide
monetary recovery to such plaintiffs, there seems to be no support for
the argument that this recovery should be limited based upon finan-
cial support received from unrelated sources.
176. See id. The amount of compensatory and punitive damages awarded under this
section shall not exceed, for each complaining party:
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 em-
ployees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen-
dar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201 em-
ployees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen-
dar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501 em-
ployees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen-
dar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.
Id.
177. Belton, supra note 169, at 767 (citing EEOC, EEOC Advance Policy Guidelines: Availa-
bility of Compensatory and Punitive Damages Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, (July 14, 1992)
(visited Jan. 24, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/damages.txt>).
178. See Douglas M. Staudmeister, Grasping the Intangible: A Guide to Assessing Nonpecu-
niary Damages in the EEOC Administrative Process, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 189, 198 (1996).
179. Id. at 198-99.
180. Id. at 199. "Moreover, equitable relief failed to redress injuries to professional
standing or reputation resulting from intentional discrimination." Id.
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Congress also expanded the forms of relief available under the
ADA in an effort to further require employers to abandon their dis-
criminatory practices. 81 Prior to facing the threat of monetary dam-
ages in the event of a successful claim for ADA violations, employers
had no practical deterrent to discriminating against the disabled.1 12 A
major goal of the ADA was "to ensure that the Federal Government
plays a central role in enforcing the standards [of the ADA] on behalf
of individuals with disabilities.""8 3 A reduction in the amount of dam-
ages an otherwise liable employer is required to pay undermines the
implied objectives of punishment and deterrence.1 84
The Social Security statute also supports the notion that recovery
is permitted and even encouraged under both programs. Although
the legislative history makes no mention of the issue of "double recov-
ery," the SSA's continuation of benefits during a trial period of work
suggests that the "SSA appreciates the unpredictability of employment
outcomes for the disabled and thus provides some measure of double-
dipping under that statutory scheme."' 85 Indeed, the work-incentive
provisions providing subsidization of a trial return to the work force is
one of the only areas in the Social Security Act that considers the no-
tion that disability and work may not be mutually exclusive.' 86
B. Application of the Collateral Source Rule to ADA Claims
In addition to the statutory provision for monetary awards under
the ADA, the doctrine of the collateral source rule is based upon the
premise that a successful plaintiff should be entitled to recover the
entire amount of his or her damage award against a defendant em-
ployer that has been adjudged liable for its actions. The collateral
source rule "focuses on what the tortfeasor and the collateral source
should pay, not on what the plaintiff should receive. Indeed, its most
obvious effect is that, in the interest of other social policies, it allows
the plaintiffs to be made more than whole for the wrongs committed
181. See id.
182. See id. at 199-00.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (3) (1994).
184. See Weston, supra note 148, at 439. "Precluding disability discrimination claims, re-
gardless of the merits of the underlying claims, simply because of statements made on
disability benefit applications, permits an employer to escape liability even if it unlawfully
discriminated or denied a reasonable accommodation to an otherwise qualified em-
ployee." Id.
185. Christine Neylon O'Brien, To Tell the Truth: Should Judicial Estoppel Preclude Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act Complaints? 3 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 349, 371 (1999); see supra notes
132-134 and accompanying text.
186. See Diller, supra note 14, at 1019.
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against them."' 87 In the context of an ADA claim, an application of
the collateral source rule permits an otherwise eligible SSDI recipient
successful in a suit for employment discrimination against his or her
employer to recover the full value of any resulting damage award,
even while continuing to receive his or her disability benefit.
Lower federal courts have been inconsistent in their application
of the collateral source rule to cases involving Title VII violations and
third-party income sources.' 88 An examination of the treatment of
the collateral source rule by lower federal courts reveals that funds
received from collateral or third party sources are generally not con-
sidered deductible from an award of damages for employment dis-
crimination.' 89 Some courts have declined to offset damage awards by
the amount of a collateral income source by holding that the legisla-
ture, not the court system, retains the authority to determine when
such a reduction is appropriate. 190 Ironically, some of the courts
which have suggested that such double recovery could be prevented
through set-offs at the trial court level have also dismissed judicial es-
toppel as a viable method of resolving these cases. 191
187. EEOC v. O'Grady, 857 F.2d 383, 389-90 (7th Cir. 1988) (internal citations
omitted).
188. See Abigail Cooley Modjeska, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 3d § 12:09 (1998).
Examples of third-party income sources include unemployment benefits, Social Security
benefits, pension benefits in which the plan is distinct from the employer, and disability
benefits. See id.
189. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., Inc., 340 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1951) (holding that
the failure to deduct unemployment benefits from a back pay award did not constitute
impermissibly making the plaintiff more than "whole"); Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l., 766 F.2d
788, 795 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that Social Security benefits could not be set off against
damages awarded in an ADEA suit), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986); McDowell v. Avtex
Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 215 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding that neither unemployment nor
pension benefits could be deducted from a back pay award in an ADEA suit), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1202 (1985); Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 82
(3d Cir. 1983) (holding that back pay awards may not be reduced by the amount of a
plaintiff's unemployment benefits in a Title VII action); Hamlin v. Charter Township, 165
F.3d 426, 436 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the collateral source benefits should not be
deducted from ajury's damage award for ADEA discrimination violations); Grady, 857 F.2d
at 391 (finding it not an abuse of the lower court's discretion to refuse to offset a back pay
award in an ADEA claim by the plaintiffs pension benefits); Gaworski v. ITT Commercial
Fin. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1114 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that unemployment benefits
should not have been deducted from award of back pay following successful ADEA claim).
190. See, e.g., Craig, 721 F.2d at 85 (rejecting argument that decision whether to offset
should be left to the discretion of district courts, preferring instead to adopt uniform rules
that further statutory aims); Gaworski, 17 F.3d at 113-14 (asserting majority rule that courts
have no discretion to deduct unemployment benefits); Dominguez v. Tom James Co., 113
F.3d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that courts have no discretion to deduct unem-
ployment benefits, but noting that some circuits have left decision to district courts).
191. See supra note 164.
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An application of the collateral source rule in this context is con-
sistent with and furthers the policy arguments articulated in the ADA's
legislative history. By permitting set-offs of ADA damage awards, an
employer who is otherwise liable under the statute receives an inadver-
tent benefit by paying less in damages than intended by the jury's or-
der. The plaintiff in turn is not rendered "whole" as Congress
contemplated when it authorized the expansion of ADA remedies to
include monetary damages. 192 Once an SSDI recipient re-enters the
workforce, he or she should be afforded the same protection against
unlawful employment discrimination as any other working individual.
If a disabled individual is able to mount a successful claim under the
ADA, he or she should not be penalized by receiving a smaller dam-
age award simply because of the receipt of an unrelated monetary
benefit.
V. CONCLUSION
In Cleveland v. Polity Management Systems Corp., the Supreme Court
adopts the prevailing opinion among the circuits on the issue of ADA
claims brought by recipients of Social Security Disability Insurance.
According to the Court, a plaintiff deemed disabled for purposes of
SSDI is not judicially estopped from presenting additional evidence
that he or she is still a "qualified individual with a disability" under the
ADA. The Court further held that a plaintiffs receipt of SSDI does
not permit courts to erect a strong legal presumption against the abil-
ity of that plaintiff to successfully bring a claim under the ADA. While
this decision appears to ease the ability of plaintiffs with ADA claims to
recover for their injuries, its impact is limited to those plaintiffs whose
claims have already reached the court system. Moreover, even though
an SSDI recipient may be permitted to assert a cause of action under
the ADA, the Court's decision provides no guarantee that the plaintiff
will be able to provide evidence sufficient to meet the standard of
proof required to overcome a defendant employer's motion for sum-
mary judgment.
Despite the limited impact that the decision may have on the
number of SSDI recipients who ultimately are able to bring claims for
ADA violations, the Court's reasoning does shed some light on the
ability of successful plaintiffs to recover the full value of an ADA dam-
age award. Although the Court does not address the issue of recovery
in such a case, were it to apply its reasoning to the question of dam-
ages, it is likely the Court would have found that a plaintiff who suc-
192. See Belton, supra note 169, at 733.
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cessfully brings an ADA claim against an employer should not have
the resulting damage award offset by the amount of the plaintiffs
SSDI benefit. The Court's reasoning in Cleveland, based in large part
on furthering the ADA's goal to end employment discrimination of
the disabled, is consistent with the idea of ensuring that plaintiffs are
"made whole" following an injury, as embodied by the collateral
source rule doctrine. However, without judicial guidance as to the
proper use of the collateral source rule in the context of ADA claims,
the import of the Court's decision to SSDI recipients with legitimate
claims of employment discrimination risks being rendered meaning-
less by lower federal courts who choose to set-off ADA damage awards
by the amount of a plaintiffs disability benefit. In order to success-
fully accomplish the ADA's goal of ending employment discrimina-
tion of the disabled, the Court's decision to reduce procedural
barriers to SSDI recipients should be supplemented by the uniform
application of a rule precluding the deduction of SSDI benefits from
an ADA monetary damages award. By guaranteeing successful plain-
tiffs the recovery of a complete ADA damage award, the collateral
source rule offers a practical method of ensuring that ADA violators
pay the full value of the sanctions entered against them and that vic-
tims of employment discrimination are "made whole" for their
injuries.
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